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Abstract In permit trading systems, free initial allocation is common practice. A
recent example is the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS). We investigate effects of different free allocation schemes on incentives
and identify significant perverse effects on abatement and output employing a simple
multi-period model. Firms have incentives for strategic action if allocation in one
period depends on their actions in previous ones and thus can be influenced by them.
These findings play a major role where trading schemes become increasingly popular
as environmental or resource use policy instruments. This is of particular relevance
in the EU-ETS where the current period is a trial-period before the first commitment
period of the Kyoto protocol. Finally, this paper fills a gap in the literature by
establishing a consistent terminology for initial allocation.
1 Introduction
More and more ecosystem resources are regulated through pricing or instruments
such as permit trading. To appease the opposition to regulation from vested interests
and facilitate the adoption of more stringent environmental goals, it has become
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common practice for the regulator to give out free permits (or tax-exemptions) to
groups of (influential or needy) resource users (polluters). Giving away the permits
free of charge means that potential efficiency gains from using these revenues to
finance public spending are foregone. This so called “revenue recycling effect” could
be quite significant (Goulder et al. 1999) but if the political resistance from vested
interests is strong enough to oppose important environmental reforms then this may
be a necessary sacrifice since instruments that benefit some economic agents may
diffuse the opposition from business (see for instance Fredriksson and Sterner 2005).
Distributing the permits for free can also be seen as compensation for sunk costs due
to changes in the business environment (Haites and Hornung 1999). In this paper,
we do not further discuss this background but focus instead on differences among
various ways of allocating permits for free.
This issue has become relevant in a very significant way due to the launching of
the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in 2005,
the largest permit trading scheme ever (IEAT 2005). We are now in a pilot phase
I (2005–2007) which is to be followed by phase II (2008–2012) corresponding to the
First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol. This is supposed to lead to emission
reductions of 5% (for the industrialised and transition economies). For this to have
sufficient impact on the climate, it must be followed by more Commitment Periods
with ever more stringent emission targets (and thus likely rising costs of abatement).
The total number of permits allocated annually in phase I of the EU-ETS is about
two billion, representing a large monetary value, even at a low permit price of 10 C.
Thus the principles for permit allocation and the readjustment of the allocations for
each new period are of great importance and interest to those affected.
In any permit trading system, the state needs to set criteria for the initial
allocation, both for existing plants when a trading scheme is established or a new
accounting period begins, and for new entrants or closures. One popular method
has been to allocate the permits in proportion to historic resource use. This is often
and somewhat loosely referred to as “grandfathering” and in Europe, where permit
allocation is fairly new, it is commonly perceived that this is the “American” way
to allocate permits (following the sulfur trading and some other policies in the
USA). For our purposes this is not sufficiently precise and we believe there are some
important differentiations that need to be made.
The linchpin of this issue is that allocation is actually a repeated game since
permits tend to be allocated several times over the life of a long program and it
may become somewhat unclear what is to be meant by “historic use.” The method
of allocation has major importance for perceived fairness, political acceptability
and economic efficiency: If firms can affect future allocations in any way by their
actions today, they have incentives to act strategically and in general, this implies
a deviation from the efficient resource allocation. As we will show below, this can
for example result in overproduction and sub-optimal abatement effort. For this
reason, economists emphasize the virtue of using truly historic data for calculating
permit allocations. We will reserve the term “grandfathering” for allocation indexed
to a base year that remains fixed throughout the whole life of the environmental
program under discussion. Grandfathering builds on leaving untouched the property-
or use-rights once handed out. The firms are then not tempted to act strategically to
influence the number of permits they get in future rounds of allocation.
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We are convinced that there is a real risk that suboptimal allocation schemes
leading to inefficient outcomes will be used. With tough competition between
countries for new investments, it will be very difficult for countries not to give new
entrants permits – particularly as long as some of their competitors do so. In addition,
if new entrants are given special permits then also existing firms are likely to argue
that they too, should be “compensated” if they expand through new investments. We
will illustrate this with the allocation procedures in the EU-ETS and its treatment of
new entrants and closures (Section 3).
Below, we develop a model to investigate the different allocation schemes and
their incentives for strategic action. We also establish a rigorous and consistent
terminology for initial allocation schemes, as this is missing up to now. We knowingly
deviate somewhat from the terminology used in Raymond (2003), but only by using
fewer and broader terms (thus, our “grandfathering” subsumes his grandfathering,
“intrinsic” and “instrumental allocation”). This is so, as the terminology we propose
is more in line with the partly established use in academic and applied environmental,
resource and regulatory economics literature, as it is simple and as it is differentiated
enough for the analysis of incentives in various initial allocation schemes, focusing
on economic rather than on legal and legal-philosophical concepts.
The next two sections present some legal and historical background for allocation
schemes and discuss some examples. Section 4 introduces the model, which is applied
in Section 5 to analyse various initial allocation schemes. Section 6 concludes.
2 Legal and historic background
Permit allocation creates a form of property rights1 and we have distinctly different
legal traditions in different parts of the World. Increasingly, hitherto free resources
such as the greenhouse gas absorption capacity of the atmosphere become scarce
and valuable by incorporating them into the economic system. Rights to such new
resources may be allocated in different ways: to owners of related property, for
example, as mineral rights belong to land owners in some countries such as the USA.
Another prominent principle is so-called “prior appropriation” which gives rights to
the first user. This can be seen as rights established by use almost like the “facts on
the ground” that conquering nations use to establish by colonizing and developing
territory taken in war. A similar principle of favouring vested interests governs water
allocation in the Western parts of the USA, for example, or allocation of quotas to
fishermen in many fisheries.2
1These rights are not always property rights in the most encompassing sense including all the
exclusivity, stability and security aspects that come with those (see Raymond 2003). Sometimes, they
are of only restricted form and the state keeps considerable power – this is the case for the permits
in the US sulfur trade, for example (EPA 1990).
2For a discussion of property rights in relation to policy instruments see Sterner (2003), Chap. 5, and
Raymond (2003) for a detailed discussion of different types of private rights to public resources.
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A “rights-based” perspective building on prior appropriation provides a solid
foundation for grandfathering. According to this view, the rights are established by
use and when codified they are then essentially perpetual and thus their base year
never changes. Grandfathering can thus be attractive to some socio-legal and cultural
traditions that will promote it politically.
If grandfathering is applied consistently, new entrants get no permits but firms
do keep their rights even when they close. To some, this might seem inappropriate
or impossible: how can closed enterprises be given rights? However with a “rights-
based” perspective as laid out above, this is no more odd than the fact that firms
closing down a plant still own the land, patents and machines. Like the latter, the
rights to carbon emissions can simply be sold if they are not to be used.
There are however other views. For instance people may view new rights as
essentially belonging to the state that defines them (as for instance mineral rights in
Sweden, Spain, and Mexico e.g. Meyer and Sherman 1979). According to this view,
the agents in the economy may still be allocated rights but somehow there has to
be a further reason or principle than prior use through which the agents earn this –
delegated – right.3 One way to earn such rights is through socially useful production
— and this is the basis for allocation based on current output or possibly some other
variable such as current fuel input multiplied by some (“fair” or “normal”) emission
factor.4 We call such a scheme “current allocation,” indicating that allocation is based
on a measure of activity in the current period.
In addition to these two (pure) principles for free5 allocation, there is a third
intermediate category. It is characterized by the use of neither historic nor current
periods of time but by values from some intermediate preceding period. We thus
call it “updating.” In later periods of a program, the original historic baseline may
appear to be very much “out of date”: We believe that, at least in Europe, the logic
of absolute grandfathered rights is not well established and instead the social norms
will favour updating or even current allocation. To make this case we will exemplify
our model with the EU-ETS and its rules for the treatment of new entrants and
closures.
3 The European union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme
Looking at the existing trading schemes, a heterogeneous picture arises (cf. also
Raymond 2003). Grandfathering is, broadly speaking, the manner in which rights
were allocated in the famous US sulfur trading program and closing firms keep their
permits while new entrants do not get permits for free (EPA 1990, Title IV, Sec.
403(a); Joskow and Schmalensee 1998; Raymond 2003). In the EU-ETS however,
3Or “licensed property,” as Raymond (2003) terms “...a private legal right that provides a significant
degree of security and exclusivity to resource users but remains unprotected from future government
adjustment or cancellation without compensation.”
4Sometimes this is called “benchmarking” and we suggest to reserve this term for technology specific
policies such as technology-specific emission rate standards or regulations in support of “best-in-
class” technologies; currently, the term is used very inconsistently and we decided not to use it at all
for our general taxonomy in this paper.
5A further alternative is of course not to allocate permits freely but sell them in an auction.
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while allocation to existing plants takes place via grandfathering based on historic
emissions, with some small amount to be auctioned (less than 5% for the first,
less than 10% for the second phase) in some countries (Egenhofer et al. 2006),
firms exiting loose their permits and new entrants gain permits in most countries
(albeit sometimes less generous than the allocation to existing firms). According to
Egenhofer et al. (2006) only the Netherlands and Sweden allow firms to keep their
allowances upon exit, and then this only extends through the end of the first period.
Thus essentially the grandfathering rule that rights are permanent is not respected.6
Both allocation for new entrants and the “use-or-lose” rule for closures may appear
to have some “common-sense appeal” but both introduce a relationship between
output and allocation. They thus both act as a subsidy to production. The “use-or-
lose” rule can similarly be seen as a tax on exit. These mechanisms foster strategic
action by the firms in the permit trading scheme.7
According to Åhman and Holmgren (2006) all countries set aside some allowances
for new entrants but the percentage varies enormously from 0,6% of all permits in
Germany to 12% in Latvia. Numbers vary not only in aggregate but also for different
plant designs. One plant design studied would receive no permits in Sweden, permits
for 100% of its emissions in a number of countries and for 105% in Germany.
Germany furthermore guarantees that the permits will be allocated for 14 years
which seems very generous considering that the current trading is only planned up to
2012. Permit allocation also involves high values, e.g. 18 to 27% of expected revenues
or 70 to 105% of fixed costs for new capacity for new entrants in the energy sectors
of Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Baltic states (Åhman and Holmgren 2006).
Recent assessments of the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for phase I consis-
tently reveal significant over-allocation. Egenhofer et al. (2006) point out that “[...]
several member states have allowed their covered sectors to increase emissions by
as much as 10 or 20%, although they are on a trajectory that will not enable them
to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets.” Similarly, Kolshus and Torvanger (2005) find
overallocation in some countries, based on simulations of the effects of the NAPs
and what would be needed to be on track with the Kyoto targets (in total +13% with
respect to the base year, and, for single countries, up to +60% with respect to the
Kyoto targets). Differentiation by sectors exposed and nonexposed to international
competition reveals particularly generous allocation to the former in most countries.
Grandfathering is perceived as unfair especially in the case that new firms have
lower emissions than older ones since it implies that “dirty” firms, which get more
generous allocations, are favoured at the expense of “cleaner” ones. The movement
away from grandfathering in Europe seems to show that the ideology of prior
appropriation rights is not so deeply rooted there. Possibly the mechanism is less
well understood or the differences in legal traditions and political economy account
for the different attitudes in the USA and in Europe. One factor is that the smaller
6There are also a couple of countries that allow some form of complex and temporary transfer of
rights within a firm from a closed plant to a new one, but this does not modify the broad picture.
7These problems would not arise for an “upstream” regulation, e.g. on the level of fossil fuel
producers based on the carbon dioxide released by the use of their products. They can only abate via
reducing output and inefficient output or abatement decisions due to strategic actions are less likely.
The EU-ETS, however, regulates “downstream” industries and the potential problems identified
above thus arise.
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the political constituency making an allocation the greater may be the temptation to
consider the effects on local employment and the more distant is the overall cohesion
of the program. Such concerns at a local level can also be observed in the USA.8
We are now in the midst of the pilot phase in the EU-ETS. The emission
inventories of the member countries were published April 2006 and permit prices
fell from about 30 to 10 C, at least partly because massive overallocation became
manifest (EU 2006). At the time of writing (mid-2006), the national allocation
principles for the next period 2008-2012 are just being established and many issues
are not yet clear, such as monitoring, sanctions and other institutional features like
the availability of a banking option for this and potential subsequent periods. On
the other hand, much has already been achieved: For the first time, the EU-ETS has
created a price signal for carbon emissions that applies across Europe and that is
being closely watched at the global scale.
4 The model
Consider the second period of a system where new entrants have received some
allocation: why should an old firm that has expanded its production not also be
rewarded with more permits? If the expansion were legally a separate entity, then
there would be an extra allocation for the “new entrant.” Plants that expand will
argue that it is unfair that they are awarded permits purely based on historic values
(before their expansion). Thus elements of allocation based on current values or at
least updating may creep into the scheme even if it was originally intended to be
grandfathered.
At a more general level, if grandfathering were to become the standard in all
resource and environmental policy (e.g. quotas for fisheries, logging and new types
of pollution) then the relevant agents would learn and adapt their behaviour: It
would be profitable for them to increase resource use or pollution in order to get a
good baseline in future rounds of allocation. Experience has shown that firms will
expend considerable rent-seeking efforts to acquire permits (see e.g. Joskow and
Schmalensee 1998) and this may become quite unwieldy in a system which implies a
massive free hand-out of over two billion permits per year.
We address these issues in a model designed to show the basic underlying incentive
structure in different allocation schemes. As an input to the ongoing discussions on
trading systems, especially in the climate and EU-ETS context, it is also worthwhile
to present these underlying mechanisms in a short, direct and easily accessible form,
as this is missing in the prior literature. A number of related models exist. Fischer and
Fox (2004), for example, include the presence of industries with different emission
intensities, of leakage (i.e. the possibility of sectors or regions without emission
reduction goals), and the interaction with the existing tax system, just to name a few.
Strategic action in the face of allocation of a renewable resource based on prior use
has been modeled in the context of fisheries, for example, explicitly incorporating the
resource dynamics (Bergland et al. 2002). Dewees (2001) addresses the differences
8See e.g. Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) for political economy issues related to the US sulfur trading
program.
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between output- and emissions based allocations and shows that the former leads
to a relative increase in output compared to the optimum. He employs a simulation
based on the specific situation of pollution regulation for electricity production in the
USA and Canada. Burtraw et al. (2002) and Burtraw and Palmer (2006) discuss the
effects of allowance allocation on the asset value of electricity utilities. These models
contain details allowing the authors to address trade-offs between different schemes
in the presence of multiple market failures or in specific existing situations.
We investigate an economy with n periods of time t ∈ {1, ..., n}, with a firm produc-
ing quantities qt of one good employing two inputs ht and xt at costs ct(qt, ht, xt, at),
where at is abatement and emissions are et(qt, ht, xt, at). c and e are assumed to be
differentiable.
Input h stands for “heat input” as many initial allocation schemes relate to the heat
input in the fuel used in production processes. h is understood to correlate highly
with emissions e. x stands for any other type of input that is not related to energy
use and emissions. This discrimination of inputs allows to capture potential effects of
allocation schemes on the relative factor use in the production process.
Output is a function of the inputs: qt = qt(ht, xt). We further assume that the
relationship between q and h is well-behaved so that it can be inverted and expressed
as ht = ht(qt, xt). This also allows us to write an input- or output-focused formula-
tion of the cost- and emissions-function:9 ct(qt, ht, xt, at) = ct(qt, ht(qt, xt), xt, at) def.=
cˆt(qt, xt, at) and ct(qt, ht, xt, at) = ct(qt(ht, xt), ht, xt, at) def.= c˜t(ht, xt, at), and similarly
for the definition of eˆ and e˜.
The firm is a price taker in the competitive market where the good is sold at the
price pt. The overall discount rate in this model is r.10 f ′k,w denotes the derivative
of the function fk with respect to w: f ′k,w
def.= ∂
∂w
fk. For the rest of the paper, we
often omit the arguments of the functions to keep the formulae simpler. We assume
the common properties for costs and emissions: For each time period t, the costs c
increase with increasing output q and also with increasing abatement a, and in both
variables at an increasing rate. The emissions e increase with increasing output q
and decrease with increasing abatement a, at a decreasing rate. Costs increase with
increasing inputs h and x and emissions increase with increasing h while they are
independent of changes in x: eˆ′t,xt = e˜′t,xt = 0.
Emissions are regulated through a tradable permit scheme which gives e¯t permits
to the firm at the beginning of each period t. The firm can comply with this goal either
by abatement or by buying additional allowances at a price pet on a permit market,
where it is a price-taker. In case emissions are lower than the permit allocation, the
firm can sell the additional unused allowances on the market. In this model, there is
no banking or borrowing of permits.11 The firm maximizes the total profit over the n
9The notion “def.= ” indicates a definition.
10Given the focus of this paper, we will not specifically discuss the role of the discount rate in the
models below.
11We do not include banking or borrowing in the model since it would obscure the basic mechanisms
of initial allocation and distorted company incentives on which we focus.
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periods, which is captured by the following two equivalent maximisation problems,
relating to an output- or input-focus of firm choices:
max
q1, ..., qn,
x1, ..., xn, a1, ..., an
n∑
t=1
1
(1 + r)t−1
(
ptqt − cˆt(qt, xt, at) +
+ pet
[
e¯t − eˆt(qt, xt, at)
] )
(1)
max
h1, ..., hn,
x1, ..., xn, a1, ..., an
n∑
t=1
1
(1 + r)t−1
(
ptqt(ht, xt) − c˜t(ht, xt, at) +
+ pet
[
e¯t − e˜t(ht, xt, at)
] )
(2)
subject to at ≥ 0, ht ≥ 0, xt ≥ 0 and qt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ 1, ..., n.
5 Readjustment of allocations
In a static (single-period) model, the initial allocation of permits e¯ can take three
different basic forms. Permits can be sold to the firms, e.g. by an auction (‘AU’),
or they can be allocated for free by grandfathering (‘GF’) based on some historic
value of emissions, input or output, i.e. independently of any current actions of the
firm, or in proportion to actual input or output (‘CA’: current allocation).12 With
CA, each unit of current output or input gives entitlement to  or η units emissions,
respectively, corresponding to some best practice or norm, which basically implies
the regulation of output or input emissions intensity rather than total emissions,
unless an aggregate cap is imposed.13
In a multiple period model there are more possible allocation methods. The
allocation for the second (and subsequent) periods may either change or continue
to depend on the same baseline used in the first period. The latter is grandfa-
thering since it continues to depend on something the firms cannot influence. If
the allocations are to change they may either depend on actual values for input
or output, reflecting the CA scheme again, or on the values for some previous
intermediate period, e.g. t − 1. The general form for the free permit allocation is thus
e¯t = e¯t(qt, qt−1, ht, ht−1, et−1) where q and h are related as discussed in the previous
section and et−1 is itself a function of qt−1, ht−1 and at−1.14 Not having xt explicitly as
12Allocation cannot be tied to actual emissions since this clearly does not make sense.
13We discuss some of the aspects of a cap below, after Table 1.
14This is sufficient to study the basic incentive structure of the readjustment schemes. Initial
allocation depending on earlier periods, t − k, k > 1 or on combinations of variables referring to
different periods, e.g. the average of some past periods’ emissions, does not add qualitatively new
insights.
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Table 1 Number of free permits e¯t according to the different options for allocation
Scheme Time Allocation criterion
Output (q) Input (h) Emissions (e)
Grand-fathering (GF) t0 q0 ηh0 αe0
Updating (UP) t − 1 qt−1 ηht−1 αet−1
Current Allocation (CA) t qt ηht n.a.
Auction (AU) 0 0 0
 and η denote output and input emissions intensities, respectively, and we require α ∈ [0, 1]
an argument in e¯ reflects the distinction we want to make by specifying two inputs:
h, one input (“heat input”) that emissions regulation may be tied to (e.g. fossil fuel
input), and x, an input that is not directly subject to such regulation (e.g. labour). In
the multi-period model we thus have the options for the initial allocation e¯t in period
t as displayed in Table 1.
The columns of the table correspond to the three different variables that can be
chosen as the “key” for allocation.15 Including the auction, we have thus defined
nine different prototype allocation schemes, AU; GFq,h,e; UPq,h,e and CAq,h16,
where we refer to the non-auction allocations by combining the abbreviations for the
schemes and the key-variables. Thus GFe means grandfathering based on historic
emissions.
Depending on the details of the system and institutional framework, there might
or might not be a strictly enforceable aggregate cap on emissions. For an auction the
aggregate cap is naturally fixed. For GF and UP a cap is fairly easy to apply, while
for current allocation it is a little more difficult since the values of the key vaiable are
not known ex ante. Without cap, these allocation mechanisms result in an emission
intensity regulation (basically equivalent to a tradable performance standard, see
e.g. Fischer 2001), but with a cap, emission intensities have to be adjusted. For CAq,
this allocation mechanism is sometimes termed a “generation performance standard”
(Burtraw et al. 2002).17
The results regarding incentives to curb emissions for the various options in the
static, one period case are well known (e.g. Sterner 2003). The derivation is similar
to the derivation of the multi-period results we present below. We briefly state
these results before deriving the more general case. In principle, three channels for
emission reduction can be identified, corresponding to the variables the firm can
15One could also think of allocations differentiated by types of outputs or inputs in case the firms
produce several outputs or employ several heat inputs. This is in fact not uncommon, but it is a
completely straightforward extension with different values of η or  for say oil or coal fired plants
and does, again, not add new qualitative insights to the analysis. The emission intensities could in
principle also change over time. They could for instance fall gradually to zero if a scheme is to transit
from free to auctioned allocation. We omit this here as well as it neither adds qualitatively to the
issues we explore.
16As already mentioned above, CAe does not make sense.
17It is equivalent to setting each firms share of initial emission allowances equal to the firms current
share in production.
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influence to maximise its profits: output, input and abatement (see also Goulder
et al. 1999). In the one period case the incentives for abatement are the same for
all the mechanisms – marginal abatement costs are equal to the permit price. But
the incentives for reduction of output or input are different. For auctioned and
grandfathered permits there is an (optimal) incentive to reduce production since the
output price includes the cost of extra permits needed to cover the marginal pollution
caused by marginal production. Similar reasoning applies for inputs. If permit
allocation is based on current output or input (CAq,h), however, this mechanism
is missing. This implies an incentive for excessively high output or input use. From
an efficiency viewpoint the main disadvantage is that the output or input effect, i.e.
the incentive to reduce emissions by reducing output or input is foregone. There is a
significant literature on this (see e.g. Goulder et al. 1999; Burtraw et al. 2002; Fischer
2003). However, the use of CAq may still be warranted in cases when an output
effect is not wanted, i.e. when one only wants to affect technology of production and
not its volume. Examples include the small open economy (when other countries
have no corresponding policy), when only a subsector of polluters is targeted, under
oligopolistic competition or if the polluters are too powerful and lobby against
policy makers (Fischer 2001; Sterner and Höglund Isaksson 2006; Fredriksson and
Sterner 2005; Gersbach and Requate 2004; Gersbach 2002). CAq has also been
implemented in a number of cases (e.g. the phase-out of lead from gasoline in the
USA (Hahn 1989)).
Much of the discussion concerning permit allocation is based on this simple static
model and the received wisdom is therefore that grandfathering, as opposed to
CA, is a sound principle. Although it does not generate revenue like auctioning it
does have correct output incentives at the margin. We now study the effects of the
mechanisms in the multi-period model. Assuming initial allocation as presented in
Table 1, i.e. dependent on current, updated or historic values of q, h or e, the first-
order conditions (FOCs) from Eqs. 1 and 2 for qt, ht, xt and at give, in a general
form18,19
1
(1 + r)t−1
(
pt − cˆ′t,qt + pet
[
e¯′t,qt − eˆ′t,qt
]) + 1
(1 + r)t p
e
t+1e¯
′
t+1,qt = 0 (3)
1
(1 + r)t−1
(
ptq′t,ht − c˜′t,ht + pet
[
e¯′t,ht − e˜′t,ht
]) + 1
(1 + r)t p
e
t+1e¯
′
t+1,ht = 0 (4)
1
(1 + r)t−1
(
ptq′t,xt − c˜′t,xt + pet
[
e¯′t,xt − e˜′t,xt
]) + 1
(1 + r)t p
e
t+1e¯
′
t+1,xt = 0 (5)
1
(1 + r)t−1
(−c˜′t,at − pet e˜′t,at
) + 1
(1 + r)t p
e
t+1e¯
′
t+1,at = 0. (6)
The terms proportional to 1
(1+r)t capture the effects of strategic action by firms that
take into account the value of future permit allocations due to current decisions.
18Use Eq. 1 to derive the FOCs for qt , Eq. 2 for ht and xt , and both equivalently for at .
19We omit the Kuhn–Tucker term from the boundary conditions qt, ht, at ≥ 0. These lead to
additional terms in the Lagrangian, λ0a(at), with λ
0
a = 0 only if at = 0, i.e. if one sits on the boundary
of zero abatement. The same applies for the q- and h-term. We discuss these terms only in one case
where they are of particular interest.
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Table 2 Output effects of the various allocation schemes
Output (q) Input (h) Emissions (e)
Grand-fathering (GF) pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt
Updating (UP) pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt
− 1+r pet+1 − η1+r pet+1h′t,qt − α1+r pet+1eˆ′t,qt
Current allocation (CA) pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt − pet pt = cˆ′t,qt + pet eˆ′t,qt n.a.
−ηpet h′t,qt
Inserting the expressions from Table 1 for the initial allocation e¯t in Eq. 3 gives the
effects on output in period t listed in Table 2. For this, h is understood as a function
of q, as for this case q, x, and a are the variables the firm bases its decisions on.
Table 2 shows, as expected, that all allocations except GF have a suboptimal price
or output effect in comparison to the (first best) efficient solution implemented by an
auction: The scarcity implied by the regulation is not fully incorporated into product
prices. Thus the general equilibrium effects of the higher product price are missing.
With UPe, the intuition is that due to the revenue from increased allocation in
period t + 1, emissions in period t get relatively cheaper. The cost of an additional
unit of emission due to increased output changes from pet to p
e
t − α1+r pet+1. This
makes production cheaper. Seen differently, UPe increases the unit revenue for
output from pt to pt + α1+r pet+1. For UPq, there is a similar effect but it applies to
directly increasing current output and thus acts as an output subsidy. The prospect of
increased permit allocation for period t + 1 makes output in period t more valuable –
per unit of output the revenue rises from pt to pt + 1+r pet+1. Similarly, output
decisions are distorted by heat input based allocation if output and input h correlate
(i.e. if h′t,qt > 0), as for example in fossil fuel fired power plants where h may stand
for fossil energy input. Corresponding results, but within one period hold for CAq,h.
Proceeding in the same way, employing Eq. 4, we get the heat input effects of the
various allocation systems (Table 3). Here q is treated as a function of h as the firm
decides on h, x and a. Deviations from the optimum again occur for all allocation
methods except GF. The mechanisms influencing incentives are the same again –
UPe makes emissions due to increased inputs at t relatively cheaper and UPh and
CAh directly act as input subsidies reducing the marginal costs of increased input.
Due to the relation between q and h, output-based allocation distorts heat input
decisions as well.
Table 3 Heat input effects of the various allocation schemes
Output (q) Input (h) Emissions (e)
Grand-fathering (GF) ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht
Updating (UP) ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht
− 1+r pet+1q′t,ht −
η
1+r p
e
t+1 − α1+r pet+1e˜′t,ht
Current allocation (CA) ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht ptq′t,ht = c˜′t,ht + pet e˜′t,ht n.a.
−pet q′t,ht −ηpet
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Table 4 Abatement effects of the various allocation schemes
Output (q) Input (h) Emissions (e)
Grand-fathering (GF) c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at
Updating (UP) c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at + α1+r pet+1e˜′t,at
Current allocation (CA) c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at c˜′t,at = −pet e˜′t,at n.a.
Again proceeding similarly, employing Eq. 5 and treating q as a function of
x, we get the effects of the various allocation systems on input x. According to
our assumption e′t,xt = 0, distortions only arise for UPq and CAq, due to the term
e¯′t,xt , which is proportional to q
′
t,xt and thus not necessarily equal to zero. Due to
assumed independence of h and x, there are no distortions on x from h-based
allocation. Comparison with Table 3, however, shows that h-based allocation distorts
the relative use of the two inputs h and x as the former becomes relatively cheaper.20
Finally, Table 4 gives the effects on abatement by inserting e¯t from Table 1 in
Eq. 6. All allocation methods except updating based on emissions (UPe) give the
same (optimal) incentives for abatement technology, i.e. abatement takes place up
to the level where its marginal costs equal the marginal payments for emissions.
Emission based updating (UPe), however, discourages abatement. Again, increased
allocation in period t + 1 makes the costs of emissions in period t relatively cheaper:
pet − α1+r pet+1. In case the period t + 1 permit price pet+1 is large enough with respect
to the price in the preceding period, α1+r p
e
t+1 can be the same order of magnitude as
pet and p
e
t − α1+r pet+1 can reach zero, implying that the incentive for abatement may
be small or even missing.21 Instead of abating now and saving the cost of current
permits, the firm inflates current emissions in order to increase allocation of valuable
permits in the subsequent period.22 Table 5 collects all these results:
Table 5 Summary of the
suboptimal effects of the
various allocation schemes
Suboptimal effects for Allocation scheme
q All but GF
h All but GF
x UPq, CAq
a UPe
20Here, q expands with increased use of h while x is not changed – but in a situation of fixed q,
substitutability assumed, h would expand at the expense of x.
21The omitted Kuhn–Tucker term accounts for the case where the combined coefficient of e′t,at is
larger than zero and the equation has no solution. at will then be chosen equal zero.
22This is however not necessarily true if banking were allowed.
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Simulations from the literature indicate that the changes in abatement and output
effects due to different allocation mechanisms can indeed be very significant. Burtraw
et al. (2001), for example, model the welfare effects of different allocation schemes
for a regulation of the electricity generating sector and identify a large output-
effect for CAq with respect to AU and also GF. For a policy with 6% reduction of
carbon emissions, output decreases by less than 0.4% for CAq and by 1.0 and 1.4%
respectively for GF and AU. Burtraw et al. (2006) simulate the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative among Northeast and Midwest Atlantic US States with regard to these
issues. They find that deviations from grandfathering can reduce the output effect
by 50%, and that they could lead to a doubling of permit prices. Goulder et al.
(1999) and Parry and Williams (1999) also contain simulation results illustrating the
significance of cost differences (and thus also of differences in the abatement and
output effects) of quota systems, performance standards, etc. to achieve a certain
reduction.
In a system with strictly enforced aggregate caps, the effects of readjustment as
described above would not be to increase overall emissions but rather raise their
price (cf. e.g. Fischer 2001; Burtraw et al. 2002). If firms do little abatement they
would all bid for a bigger share of the same amount of permits and the price
of current permits would rise thereby restoring incentives for abatement. Due to
differences between the firms this would likely lead to some redistribution, but it
would not affect the overall environmental effect. However, it may nevertheless
accelerate introduction of new technologies. On the other side, the output effect
of updating, respectively the corresponding implicit subsidy on production and the
reduction in variable costs are still present for readjustment with strict caps and lead
to considerable welfare losses (Burtraw et al. 2001).
If however there is no aggregate cap or if enforcement of the system is likely
to be lax – and we focus on these cases here – with UPe, there will be reduced
abatement and higher emissions. The other schemes are only distorted in quantity
(both input and output) and not in abatement. This, however, will indirectly lead to
higher emissions as well.
Although enforcement was largely successful in the classical regional or national
US trading schemes (Sulfur, Lead, RECLAIM, see Tietenberg 2006), enforcement
of the system is a major uncertainty in the case of the EU-ETS. Many details such as
penalties for non-compliance have been decided at some level of generality,23 but it is
still fair to say that there is quite some uncertainty concerning actual implementation
and enforcement in practice. Maybe the strongest source of this uncertainty is the
inability of the EU to enforce its macroeconomic stability pact (EU 1997). This
pact is one of the pillars of macroeconomic policy in the EU in the last decade (it
was adopted in 1997) and a very important part of the common currency policy.
In fact this pact, which concerns the budget discipline of the member countries,
is quite essential for the stability of the Euro. Originally Germany was one of the
countries that was most sceptical to the budget discipline of other member countries
and therefore as a prerequisite for a common currency, all countries are required
to keep government deficits below 3% of GDP. France and Germany itself broke
23Penalties for non-compliance are at 40C/t CO2eq for the first phase period and 100C/t CO2eq
for the second. These fees do not absolve from the obligation to acquire the necessary certificates
(EU 2003a).
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this rule in 2003 and consequently were placed in an excessive deficit procedure
by the ECOFIN Council. However due to their considerable power within the EU,
the two countries managed to persuade other members not to vote to sanction and
fine them in the European Union’s Council of Ministers (EU 2003b). The European
Commission (the executive part of the EU) then brought the case in the European
Court of Justice. Enforcement of the pact was decided there, but no fine has been
paid up to now – and no one is expecting it to be paid (Feldstein 2005). When such
a high-level, prominent and clear system is allowed to break down then this implies
that the ability of politicians to commit to any form of sanctions in other agreements
including the Kyoto Protocol and ETS is strongly compromised. This view may be
supported by the current difficulties in getting the member states to file the NAPs for
phase two in time (Euractiv 2006).
6 Conclusion
We have built as simple a model as possible to show that the readjustment schemes
for permit allocation can result in reduced abatement activity, quite opposite to the
overall goal of permit trade. This or a similarly unwanted output or input effect occur
if the allocation can be influenced by actions of the firms, i.e. if the allocation depends
on emissions (inputs or output) in the previous (or current) period.
Free allocation of valuable permits is bound to create problems. The very reason
for giving them out free rather than reaping the efficiency benefits of revenue
recycling, is the existence of powerful vested interests that the policy maker wishes
to appease. Thus the stage is set for considerable infighting and rent-seeking. From
the viewpoint of efficiency the least damage is done by sticking to a once and for
all allocation that we have referred to as grandfathering. As soon as the allocation
mechanisms are updated, new rounds of rent-seeking will be set in motion and
incentives will be created for excess pollution, production or input. See Smith (2006)
on plans to build eleven new coal-fired power plants in Texas that seem to provide a
bold example of such speculation to get a bigger share of permits in a potential future
carbon regulation expectedly based on grandfathering.
As mentioned in preceding sections, we believe that there are strong forces that
will push us in the direction of updating and output based current allocation both in
the case of climate policies in the various commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol
or whatever international agreement succeeds it. Correspondingly, this can also
happen for new areas of environmental regulation (e.g. newly regulated fisheries)
where firms that learn that grandfathering will most likely be used for all resource
and environmental problems try to affect initial allocation of user rights by rapacious
over utilization of the resource to be regulated.24
The EU-ETS first period which is explicitly said to be a “trial” period, involves
countries that have little experience with permit schemes and in some cases little
interest in the whole scheme. They also have a recent history of allowing themselves
to break rules such as the stability pact. It is thus fairly likely that enforcement will be
24Not only firm action may push for such a development. Allocation schemes with implicit subsidies
can also be attractive as transition policies to protect regulated industries that have to compete in an
open economy with unregulated competitors.
Climatic Change (2008) 86:33–49 47
lax. In this situation the individual countries’ industries lobby organizations may well
be successful in acquiring a very large number of permits for each member state’s
industrial sector. This happened for the pilot period of the EU-ETS, as the national
allocation plans and the publication of the emission inventories for the member states
showed. They reveal heavy overallocation to the industries subject to the trading
system. Such issues pose an excess burden to achieve reductions on the sectors not
regulated under the EU-ETS (such as transport and households) and will make it
difficult to meet Kyoto targets for the whole economy which will further lower the
credibility of the whole agreement.
Thinking about improvements of the current greenhouse gas emissions regula-
tions, one could clearly take up the discussion on price vs. quantity measures (cf.
e.g. Nordhaus 2005). With a global harmonized carbon tax, the problematic issue of
initial allocation would not arise. The pros and cons of these different approaches,
however, have to be seen against the background of the already existing quantity
regulation within the Kyoto-protocol and how this might shape future discussions.
Furthermore, strategic actions and political economy terms could be expected to
influence the design of a global carbon tax as well (e.g. Dijkstra 1999; Svendsen
et al. 2001) and may lead to similarly sub-optimal solutions regarding incentives
for abatement (e.g. via some type of refunded emission payments or tax exemption
schemes) to gain support from industries and to avoid deadlock of the discussions on
a global regulation.25
The best way for improvement may well be to announce a gradual transition to an
auctioned system. Åhman et al. (2007) describe such a system for an existing trading
scheme and one reasonable mechanism to enlarge it towards a global system would
be to allow this transition to depend on the rate of expansion of climate targets
throughout the World Economy. When all (major) economies are included in the
same agreement, there is no longer any carbon leakage argument in favor of limiting
the burden to domestic industries.
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